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SA/PDS/KC

COMOR-M-196

COMMITTEE ON OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE

Minutes of Meeting Held in Control Center
Langley, Central Intelligence Agency
10 am--2 pm, 6 September 1963

PRESIDING

NRO & DIA REVIEWS COMPLETED

James Q. Reber
Chairman

MEMBERS PRESENT

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[Redacted]

Capt. H. H. Skidmore, ONI
Col. G. J. P. Lundquist, AFNIN

Deputy Chairman

Mr. C. W. Snider, State

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[Redacted]

Lt. Col. H. E. Ruhsam, OACSI

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CONSULTANTS PRESENT

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[Redacted]

Mr. J. C. St. Cyr, OACSI

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Office of the Chairman

Chairman, Target Working Group

Approval of Minutes

1. COMOR-M-194 and 195 were approved.

Operational Briefing

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2. [Redacted] briefed the COMOR on the status of satellite operations. He noted that, after there had been a failure to activate 1001, it was decided to recover the second package which, of course, would have had no film exposed. The second package was separated over the Pacific and at the time of the meeting search was still underway for it. In reviewing the schedule for photographic satellites, [Redacted] reported that some trouble was being encountered [Redacted] and we could not expect 8004 to go any earlier than 8 October. A good guess would be that 8006 would be delayed until close to December.

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is expected to be ready by 26 November. The schedules for 1002 and 1003 still seem to be firm. Present plans call for the former to be flown on a 4-8-3 basis; the Zombie time of 1003 depends on too many factors to speculate at this time on what the period will be but it is hoped that the second package will go the full 4 days.

Report on Recent Photo Reconnaissance

3. [] briefed the Committee on the readout on [] During the course of the briefing, Captain Skidmore raised the question of the coverage of Hainan Island by 171 and 6066. It was pointed out that 6066,

[] The weather was poor. The weather also interfered with the attempt by 171 to cover the northern tip of Hainan.

Report from Chairman, TWG

4. [] reported on the following actions by the Target Working Group:

a. The biweekly report on Cuba for forwarding to USIB was approved.

b. Problems arose in connection with monthly revision of Cuba targets. An attempt to add a number of apparently minor objectives and target areas uncovered the fact that there has apparently been inadequate reporting on the readout of these targets. As this appeared to arise from misunderstandings between the service elements in NPIC, the PI's, and the Secretariat in NPIC, the decision was made to refer the question to ADCOM. COMOR approved this action and, while confirming the undesirability of adding objectives to the present reconnaissance list, recognized the need for a better reporting procedure after NPIC has studied such areas.

c. The KH-4 listings were revised on the basis of 1001. Six targets were added, 102 were updated, and 23 were deleted. The listings for KH-6, [] and manned overflight were also modified.

d. The Working Group received from DIA a revision of the "Useable Coverage Composite Index" and approved forwarding it to NRO. This updating now goes through Mission 9057.

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
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Upon the request of [redacted] the Chairman agreed to prepare a memorandum formally endorsing continuing updating action on the part of DIA followed by referral to the Working Group. The Working Group will then decide on forwarding updatings to NRO.

e. Priority KH-4 targets were established for the USSR and China(one target for China).

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


Briefing on Availability of Cuba Beaches

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5. [redacted] submitted the following briefing note and indicated that he would brief the COMOR more fully at the 12 September meeting.

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These auxiliary equipments will be flight tested with a view toward providing the maximum intelligence of the type required.

c. Since these tests involve the matching of several sensors for possible commitment against targets under variable atmospheric conditions; day, night, twilight, snow cover, etc., a maximum time period of three months has been assigned for completing the optimum system. Preliminary flight test results should be available for study by 30 September 1963.

The COMOR requested [] to advise at the next briefing whether it would be possible to speed up the testing so that the operational date would be earlier than now anticipated []

[] He was also asked to brief on whether any IR capability is contemplated for [] COMOR noted [] suggestion that at some future date it might be advisable to ask [] to brief COMOR on its infrared interpretation techniques.

Request for Coverage of Cuba Beaches

6. The Committee considered a redraft on this subject prepared by the Chairman. Further drafting took place and the Chairman offered to distribute another draft incorporating the views by noon, 9 September. If all agreed, the paper would be forwarded to the Board for their consideration at their 11 September meeting. If there was disagreement the Chairman will call a special meeting on the afternoon of 9 September.

Instructions on Control of Documents (COMOR-D-1/4)

7. This item was postponed at the request of [] but will be returned to the 12 September agenda.

Releasability of [] Photography over Burma (COMOR-D-22/36)

8. The Committee concurred in the proposal of this paper. The participating agencies will now advise all necessary users that photography over Burma acquired from the Missions 3121, 3122, and 3126 may now be released from the TALENT System classified SECRET NOFORM DISSEM. (The Chairman at the meeting had indicated that this

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
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paper would have to go to the Board for vote slip approval. After the meeting and on examination of the history of this problem, he reached the conclusion that the action of the Committee above applied to its own procedures earlier stated in COMOR-D-22/24 and accordingly should stand without Board vote slip approval.)

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Priority Categories for KH-4 Targeting (COMOR-D-56/19)

11. The Chairman noted:

a. That the subject of the paper should have included "and manned" before "targeting" on the first page in the subject and on the second page in the heading;

b. That [redacted] had raised an objection to para 2 of the covering memo which referred to COMOR's concern with the angle of inclination; and

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c. That [] called COMOR's attention to the fact the inclusion of the words "sun angle" in the Extraordinary Priority and Priority No. 1 was unnecessary.

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At the Chairman's request [] discussed items b and c above with [] It was agreed to remove para 2 of the covering memo and to leave the reference to "sun angle" in the paper. The Chairman will reissue this paper with the corrections indicated above as COMOR-D-56/20.

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Revision of the Statement of Reconnaissance for High-Altitude Coverage of Cuba(Working Paper)

13. The Chairman tabled a draft memo on the above subject which he believed COMOR should consider looking for the more effective use of high-level reconnaissance assets over Cuba. (See COMOR-M-197, para 2 for action of COMOR on this subject at a special meeting on 9 Sept.)

Opportunity to Procure Photographic Coverage of Burma

14. [] reported that DDP had an opportunity to support a 2-year project for aerial mapping of 81,000 square miles

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of Burma by a commercial company. Discussion disclosed that DIA is considerably involved in an overall program for mapping and charting many inadequately covered areas of the world. and [] pointed out that this is probably just one of many similar programs, that Burma is not unique and they finally made the point that these are not intelligence programs. The Chairman asked [] to check this particular project with [] and suggested that he communicate directly with []. It was the consensus of COMOR that all advantage should be taken of any opportunity to collect information of potential value to intelligence but that COMOR should not become involved in a project not strictly designed to procure intelligence.

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James G. Reber

Chairman

Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

Copies 2, 3 State TCO
 4 DIA []
 5, 6, 7, 8 DIA TCO
 9 OACSI TCO
 10, 11 ONI TCO
 12 -15 AFNIN TCO
 16, 17 NSA TCO
 18, 19 NRO TCO

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	20	TSO CIA
	21-30	Asst/OPS(NPIC)
	31	LS/PID(NPIC)
	32	DDI TCO SpeCenter
	33, 34	CGS
	35, 36	CIA Member COMOR
	37	CGS/ReqBr/ReconGrp
	38	Ch/COMOR WkgGrp
	39	AD/SI
	40	ONE TCO
	41	DDP TCO
	42	DDS&T TCO
	43	AD/OSA
	44	FA/OSA
	45	Intel/OSA
	46	SO/OSA
	47	SAL/OSA
	48-51	SA/DDS&T

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